New Insights on the Organization of Agricultural Research: Theory and Evidence for Western Developed Countries by Huffman, Wallace E.
Economic Staff Paper Series Economics
7-1999
New Insights on the Organization of Agricultural
Research: Theory and Evidence for Western
Developed Countries
Wallace E. Huffman
Iowa State University, whuffman@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers
Part of the Agribusiness Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons, Growth and
Development Commons, and the International Economics Commons
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Economic Staff Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Huffman, Wallace E., "New Insights on the Organization of Agricultural Research: Theory and Evidence for Western Developed
Countries" (1999). Economic Staff Paper Series. 316.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/econ_las_staffpapers/316
New Insights on the Organization of Agricultural Research: Theory and
Evidence for Western Developed Countries
Abstract
Public and private R&D are important sources of advances in knowledge leading to new technologies for and
products from agriculture in western developed countries. Over the past fifteen years, a significant reduction
in the rate of growth of public funding for agricultural research in western developed countries has occurred
relative to the preceding decade. The future, however, holds unexplored options for the organization of public
agricultural research. Advances in the theory of impure public goods can be applied to create new financing
jurisdictions and funding sources for public agricultural research. Advances in principal-agent theory can be
applied to the unique characteristics of the R&D production process, i.e., output is highly uncertain and
administrators cannot effectively monitor scientists' effort, to design incentive compatible contracts that
significantly improve scientists' attention to effort and quality of research payoffs. Some implications for
alternative finding mechanisms are developed. The paper concludes with several new insights about the likely
organization of agricultural research in western developed countries for the 21st century.
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New Insights on the Organization ofAgricultural Research:
Theory and Evidence for Western Developed Countries
byWallace E.Huffinan
Public and private R&D are important sources of advances in knowledge leadmg to new
technologies for and products from agriculture in western developed countries. Over the past
fifteen years, asignificant reduction in the rate of growth ofpublic funding for agricultural
research in western developed countries has occurred relative to the preceding decade. The
future, however, holds unexplored options for the organization ofpublic agricultural research.
Advances in the theory of impure public goods can be applied to create new financing
jurisdictions and funding sources for public agricultural research. Advances in principal-agent
theory can be applied to the unique characteristics of the R&D production process, i.e., output
is highly uncertain and administrators cannot effectively monitor scientists' effort, to design
incentive compatible contracts that significantly improve scientists' attention to effort and
quality of research payoffs. Some implications for alternative fimding mechanisms are
developed. The paper concludes with several new insights about the likely organization of
agricultural research inwestern developed countries for the 21st century.
Key words: agriculture, research, organization, finance, developed countries, impure public
goods, principal-agent models, twenty-first century.
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It is now well accepted that institutionalized research, rather than research by farmers, is
aimportant source of discoveries leading to newitechnologies that facilitate the modernization
ofagriculture and total factor productivity increases. In most western developed countries, the
research is financed and conducted byboth public and private institutions. Research, however,
is avery different activity to foster, promote, and finance in ways that bring forth the full
creativity and'effort ofscientists/researchers. We are only beginning tot^^ touncover the
secrets to good organization.
The objective ofthis paper is tosummarize recent developments and emerging trends in
the organization of agricultural research,- discuss new insights on financing agricultural
research, and examine efficient incentives for scientists and R&D in general., The final section
ofthepaper willdevelop some implications for.the organization of agricultural research in the
21st century. The paper draws heavily from myresearch inHuf&nan andJust (1999a,b; 1998),
Huffman (1999), and Just and Huffman.
2nd Mansholt Lecture, WageningenAgriculturalUniversity,Wageningen,The Netherlands,
May 19, 1999. . • ^ .
Recent Developments and Emerging Trends
Some important recent developments and emerging trends in the organization of
agricultural R&D in western developed countries are identified and discussed briefly.
Development 1: The rate of growth of public agricultural research expenditures has been
reduced significantly. During 1971-1981, the annual (compound) average growth rate of real
agricultural research expenditures for these 18 western developed countries was arelatively large
2.9 percent, 3.2 percent for the Western European countries and 2.6 percent for the North
American countries (table 1). For all ofthe countries except Germany, the growth rate was.
positive. During 1981-1993, the growth rate for public agricultural research expendhures,
however, was significantly lower by about 1percentage point—1.9 percent for all 18 countries,
2.2 percent for the Western European countries, and 1.9 percent for the North American
countries. During this latter period, three countries (Belgium, Greece, and Ireland) had negative
growth in agricultural research expenditure, the U.K. had no net growth, and Canada had an
average growth rate of only 0.26 percent. Over the two combined periods, Germany has almost
no net growth inpublic agricultural research expenditures.
Development 2: Traditional national (or central) government funding sources for
agricultural research are reducing systematic funding, including formula orprogram
funding, and increasing emphasis on centrally controlled competitive grant programs. This
new direction is especially apparent in the United Kingdom and less in the United States and
Germany. During 1972-1982, most of the U.K. public agricultural research fimds were allocated
noncompetitively by the Ministry ofAgriculture, Food, and Fisheries on aprogram basis
3(Thirtle, et al 1997). The latest major redirection ofU.K. public agricultural research started in
1982. As a result, some applied research institutionswere sold to the private sector. The
national government cut ear-marked or programftmding for institutes and laboratories that were
engaged in "riearmarket"and"agricultural productivity enhancing" research and increased
funding for the HigherEducationInstitutes (HEI) and.the Biotechnology and Biological Science
Research Institute (BBSRJ). The latter two institutes primarily operate competitive grants
programs in "basic science" and in Vpublic interest" researchfocused on food safety and •
environmental issues. Scientists from a broad set ofinstitutions are eligible, to bid on HEI and-
BBSRI projects.' In 1993/94, competitive grant funds for agricultural research increased to 20
percent of public funds allocated to agricultural research (but 80 percent continue to be allocated
as program funds or block grants to agricultural research institutions). See Thirtle et al 1997.
In the U.S:,' the composition of the "regular federal"!funding (i.e.. Cooperative States •
Research Service, CSRS, or Cooperative States Research, Education, and Extension Service,
ESREES) and mechanism for allocating federal funds to the state agricultural experiment station
system (and other cooperating state institutions) have changed. In 1887, when the SAES system
was first covered by the new passed Hatch Act, approximately 82 percent of SAES funding-from
the national government came from regular federal funds. This share trended downward to'.
65 percent in 1900, 22 percent in 1960, and 14 percent in 1990 but were larger in 1996
(15 percent) (Huf&nan and Just 1991a). The share of regular federal funds distributed by
competitive grants to SAES was 0 in 1980, 8.6 percent in 1990, and 16.6percent in 1996
(Huffinan and Evenson 1993,Huffman and Just 19993). Hence, "regular federal" funds for
4agricultural research are being ^located increasingly bycompetitive .grants and less by formula. ,
or block grants to state.'
Historically a legislated formulafor allocating federal appropriations to the SAESsystem
has beencentral to nationalgovernment funding of publicagricultural research(Huffman and
Evenson 1993, pp. 21-23; Alston andPardey 1996, Ch. 2; Fuglie et. al. 1996). Initially every.f
state received an equal sized national government appropriation, but overthe period1935-55, the
formula wasmodifiedto also dependon a state's shareof total U:S. farm population and total ,
U.S. rural people.'After strong encouragement from theNational Research Council, theUSDA ,
initiated a Competitive Grants Programs in 1977.' Its funding increased substantially beginning
with the National Research Initiative (NRI) in 1986. TheNRI competition is open to all public
andprivateresearchers. .' < • ...
Development 3\ Public agricultural research scientists are being encouraged to pursue
nontraditional sources of funding such.as outside departments (ministers) of agriculture in
national governments, private corporations, producer (commodity or cooperative) groups.
The trend is strongest in theUnited Kingdomvthe U.S.-, France, theNetheriands, and Canada.
In theUnited Kingdom, the recent redirection of agricultural research' funds away from the
Ministry ofAgriculture, Food, and Fisheries to the Higher EducationJnstitutes and establishment
of newstatutory bodies (commodity groups) to.fimd agricultural research represents a new
emphasis onnontraditional agricultural' research ftmding (Smith 1996; Thirtle, et. M. 1997).. "•
In 1993/94, theHEI fimds represented 15percent of expenditures on U.K. pubhcagricultural
research,which was considerably larger thai!the,5.5 percentshare in 1987/88.,.
5Inthe U.S. atboth the state.and federal level, nontraditional sources ofresources and .
technology transfer have been developed recently. Over the past two decades, SAES scientists in
the U.S. have turned increasingly-to "non-regular federal" and private s_ector sources. In 1960,
the share ofSAES system fimding coming from nontraditional federal, government sources
5.7 percent, and it has grown-12 percent in 1970 (1.980,1990), and 15 percent in 1996 (see
Huffman and Just 1999a). These funds were distributed by the USDA incontracts and
cooperative agreements and by the,National Institutes ofHealth, the U.S. Agency for
International Development, the National Science.Foundation, the U.S. Department ofHealth and
Human Services, thePublic Health Service, and other agencies primarily.-by competitive grants.
During the.past decade, U.S;ffederal laboratories have greatly increased the amount of
collaborative research with theprivate sector. The 1986 Technology Transfer Act established a
mechanism, a CRADA, through which federal andnon-federal researchers,could collaborate
(Fuglie etal. 1996, p. 55); This legislation permits federal laboratory to enter into CRADA's
with universities, private companies, nonTfederal government entities, and others. The principle
objective of a CRADA, however, is to link thepretechnology research capacity of federal
laboratories with the commercial research and marketmg expertise of the,private sector. The
cooperating instimtion receives the rights offirst refusal toany joint discovery and may be given
exclusive access to data from a joint project (Fuglie et. al. 1996, p.56). CR^A activity has
increased rapidly after 1987, buttheprivate sector CRADA resources are less than 1percent of
the budget oftheAgricultural.Research Service ofthe USDA (Huffman and Just 1999b). ,
In France, the growth of systematic/program funding for research in national institutes
hasnot beenfast enoughto coverthe costof experimentation. Scientists are^now encouraged to
6undertake cooperative or joint venture projects with public (regional governmental) and private
sector partners. In theNetherlands, there has been a large increase in thenumber ofpublic-
private partnerships for agricultural research, including the.private sector investing significantly
in resources of the public institutions. In Italy, fimding of public agricultural research by the
National Research Coimcil,Ministry of Industry and Trade, and Ministry ofResearch and
Universities represent nontraditional sources (Huffman andJust 1999b).
In Canada, since the early 1980s, commodity, producer, processor, and trade associations
havebeencollecting funds for financing agricultural research. These groups include the
Canadian Horticultural Council, the Canola Council ofCanada, the Brewing and Malting Barley
Research Institute, and the Canadian and Western Grains Councils (Guitard 1985). However, a
new agricultural research policy was established in 1994, theMatching Investment Initiative
(Mil). Under this program, the federal government matches up todollar-for-dollar the private
sector's contributions to joint researchventures. TheMil was implemented by the federal
government to offset declines in federal fimding for a^culturai research. Also, new fimds for
public research are coming firom commodity check-offprograms for wheat, barley, and beef.
Although there is clearly increased emphasis on obtaining private sector fimding for
public agricultural research institutions, the share ofthe total fimds that these institutions
research fi-om theprivate sector is small. Among the western developed coimtries, theU.S.
receives the largest share ofprivate sector fimding ofpublic agricultural research, 7.5 percent in
1960,9.2 percent in 1980, and 14.3 percent in 1996 (Huffinan and Just 1999a,b). Private sector
funding ofresearch inpublic institutions raises a number ofpolitical-economic issues that do not
appear in private sector funding of its own activities.
1'
Development 4: Public universities areincreasingly entering into and contempiating
exclusive joint ventures with a particular large agro-chemical company. The University of
California-Berkeley has entered into anunusual partnership onR&D. andotherinstitutions,
e.g., University ofMissouri, are evaluating alternatives. Novartis has agreed toprovide
$25 million for funding over5 years of research projects largely in.theDeparttnent of Plant
and Microbial Biology, University of California-Berkeley, andto pay. possibly $25 million for
renovations of laboratories for the above department. Theresearch funds forprojects areto be
channeled through a faculty controlled committee thatwill evaluate.research proposals. Novartis
is apparently needing a new source of discoveries inthe plant science area beyond itsown
scientists or that it can easily acquire throughmergers or purchase in the IPRmarket. It will get
exclusive rights to develop themost promising scientific discoveries fora fixed period of time
after the discovery. : •
- The College ofNatural Resources at Berkeley apparently saw no state government
support for renovating its laboratories in Plant and Microbial Biology in thenearfuture butfelt
that obsolete laboratories could undermine theirotherwise high quality research program. The
Novartis-Berkeley partnership raises serious issues about conversion of use of publicfacilities
andscientists to private gainfor oneparticular.company. It may, however, be a usefiil model for
a university research progr^ that has lost its public funding base for new or renovated
laboratories and possibly for salariesand currentexpense flmds. -
8New Financing Prospects
The emphasis is on financing discoveries that are impure public goods, i.e., ones that
have both public and private good dimensions (Huffman and Just 1999b; Huf&nan 1999).
New Jurisdictions and Clubs
The theory ofpublic goods is central to our understanding ofthe economics offinancing
and organizing agricultural research. Some agricultural research produces pure public goods,
meaning that innovations are nonrivai (being indivisible) and nonexcludable (being costly to
selective withholding). For example, the scientific discovery by James Watson and Francis
Crick in 1953 of the structure ofDNAandsuggestion of howit replicates created a pure
(multinational) public good. Once their findings were published, access to the knowledge was
unlimited. Because the discovery was ofthe nature ofan abstract concept and not embodied ina
particular product, material, or process it was not patentable. Given the discovery that agene
was aspecific sequence ofbases (proteins) in DNA, other scientists were then able to envision
the growth and fimctioning oforganisms as programmed by functional base sequences.
Much agricultural research, however, produces impure public goods which are partially
excludable. Access tobenefits ofresearch may have a geographical dimension, (e.g., local,
regional, national, or international), usefulness may be limited to particular plant or animal
species, or strong intellectual property rights, e.g.,-patents, trade secrets, breeders' rights, may be
politically, economically, and legally feasible giving owners sole right to control or license an
innovation's use for a fixed period. For example, the U.S. patent system now gives an inventor
the right to control the use ofhis/her discovery for 20 years.
9Some examples illustrate partial excludability.ofbenefits-for scientific innovations. First,
consider the public applied agricultural research atKansas State University that led toa new hard
redwinterwheat variety in 1995that was uniquely adapted to Kansasgrowingconditions and
widely adopted byKansas farmers in 1996 and 1997.' Because thewheat variety is self-
pollinated, farmers cansave their own seed for replanting the following year. ;This use of
so-called "bin-run" seed greatly reduces private sector.interest in wheat varietal development.'
Benefits of the research spilled across state boundaries in the sense that the new variety also
replaced some acreage of older hard red-winter wheatvarieties in the surrounding statesof
Oklahoma, Colorado, and Nebraska, but in other states, the new variety was either not good
enough to dislodge older varieties or hard red >vinter wheat is not grown.
•Second, the discovery,of the structure^pfDNA,enabled later discoveries, some ofwhich
were patentable and generated large licensing revenue and new compaiues. That is, an
intellectual property right system can be used to make excludability economically feasible and to
convert discoveries into impure public goods that are marketable. For example, the discovery by
Cohen and Boyer in 1973 of the basic technique.for recombinantDNA, the splicing of genes
possibly from different species, was both a discovery of a method and a.product. The Cohen- .
Boyer patent on the basic technique ofgene-splicing was awarded in 1980 to Stanford University
and the University of California and launched the new field of genetic engineering (Office
ofTechnology Assessment 1989). Boyer then bec^e a cofounder of the private company .
Genentechabout 1980 in an effort to exploit commercialpossibilities ofgenetic engineering.^
Third, Monsanto discovered and patented a Roundup Ready technology for soybeans in
1995. A U.S. patent limits the use of this technology for 20 years, and Monsanto charges a
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technology fee of$5 per acre (initially) for the use ofRoundup Ready technology embedded in
soybean varieties. The technology changes weed management from several applications of
several active ingredients peryear to a single application ofone broad-spectrum herbicide. The
average reduction inweed control cost, including the added cost ofthe technology fee, has been
about $10 per acre (Carlson, Marra, and Hubbell 1997). Roundup Ready soybeans allow farmers
to plant innarrow rows ordrill seeds, which reduces soil erosion over wide-row planting and
crowds out someweeds. Farmers, however, must forego savingand using their own soybean
seed from Roundup Ready varieties. Monsanto has found it profitable toprice Roimdup Ready
technology toachieve widespread adoption by soybean producers, and this allows farmers and
consumers ofsoybean products to share inthe benefits of the new technology. Over the long
termscientist will be able to iimovate around Monsanto'spatentand the life of the patent is
limited. Hence, thebenefits from the Roundup Ready technology for soybeans isonly partially
appropriable toMonsanto or partially excludable.
Because oflimited potential appropriability ofdiscoveries that are ofa pure public good
nature, e.g., the discovery ofthe structure ofDNA, the private sector will grossly underfiind this
type ofresearch relative to the social optimum or not finance itat all (Huffman and Just 1999a;
Comes and Sandier 1996). Hence, the public sector can beexpected to play amajor role in
financing fundamental discoveries that are ofapure public good nature. More applied and
product/design or process/method oriented discoveries that the fimdamental discoveries enable
have higher expected appropriability through patenting, and the private sector can be expected to
finance amajor share ofthem, e.g., the development ofbt cotton and com. Round Up Ready
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Soybeans, bGH or bSt for dairy cows. Advances in technology, however, sometimes lead to
advances in science to resolve unanticipated outcomes.
Positive externalities orspillovers are common with research and other public goods,
and they frequently are asource of socially inefficient decisions on-optimal provision. When a
public good, say ascientific innovation, provides benefits outside the political jurisdiction that
finances/provides it, and no compensation is paid by. outsiders; positive externalities in the form
of spillovers occur. Spillovers occur when the "economic jurisdiction" or impact area is larger
than the political boundaries or the fmancing jurisdiction. For agricultural research (and other
public goods), it is important to distinguish between "political or decidmg" and "economic or
benefitting" jurisdictions (Comes and Sandier 1996; Olson 1969, 1986). Serious social
inefficiency arises inthe form ofunderinvestment either when an economic jurisdiction is
broader than the political jurisdiction (as above) in.both examples orwhen the economic
jurisdiction isa small subpart ofa larger political jurisdiction and provision ofresearch funds,
e.g., is bycollective action (Olson 1969,1986), i.e., a local public good.
Some scientific discoveries have beneficiaries that are not defined geographically, and
Olson (1986) suggests calling them the"clientele" and Comes and Sandier (1996) suggest
calling them a "club." With public agricultural research funded by collective action, scattered
research clientele (or club members), increases greatly thecost of organizing to finance
agricultural research, and as the number ofmembers in the clientele group orclub grows, the
free- or easy-rider problem generally causes.the group to lose it power and.to become political
ineffective (Olson 1965; Comesand Sandier 1996). For these clientele groups to be politically
effective, they must solve the free-rider problem,i'
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One effective means of solving this problem is to obtain federal legislation requiring
participation of target-group members. In theUnitedStates, the 1985 farmbill permitted
agricultural commodity groups to holda referendum forcoverage bymandatory commodity
check-offprograms to finance commodity promotion and agricultural research. A commodity
group is then designated to managethe check-offf\mds, e.g, theNationalPork Council, the
National Com Growers Association, National Soybean Association, National Cattlemen's
-Association. In Canada and the United Kingdom, national legislation has also enabled producer
commodity councils to funding research and otheractivities (Huffman and Just 1998; Guitard
1985; Smith 1996; Thirtle et. al 1997).
Private interest group financingofpublic agricultural research is socially efficient if
(1) all of the beneficiaries of the research are included in the "group" and (2) the private
financing does not adversely affect (i.e., crowd out) the amountof pubhc resources allocated to
other sociallyworthwhile agricultural research. Unfortunately, one or both of these conditions
are seldom met. First, the (potential) beneficiaries of agricultural research are generally much
larger than any particularcommodity group(or corporation). Notablyover the long-run, a large
shareof the benefitsof publicagricultiu^al research goes to consumers (seeAlstonand Pardey
1996, Ch. 5). In contrast to the broad distributional benefits associated withpublic research, a
large share (but notall) of thebenefits ofprivate sector agricultural research goes to the
companies financing andconducting theresearch (Huffman and Evenson 1993). Second,
research as a production process has a large amount ofex ante uncertainty and public institutions
thatareunder financial distress fi-equently lookfavorably on almost anyoutside source of
fimding. Thus, a private group is frequently able to contract with a public research institute to
13
undertake a project for less thmthe expected cost which creates joint public-private financing.
Hence, public funds that would otherwise have gone to other public agricultural research projects
having greater publicgoods content are redirected by thejoint venture.
From a public interest perspective, the key issue is the size of the social payoff for the
joint public-private venture versus purely publicly fmanced projects which are foregone by the
redirection ofpublic resources to thejointventure project. If the social opportunity cost is low,
then the redirection is socially good, but if the opportunity cost is high, society is worse off by
these jointpublic-private ventures than if no private funding ofpublic agricultural research
occurred. SeeUlrick, Furtan, and Schmitz(1986) for adverse effects of private fimding of barley
research, and Huffman and Just (1994) for adverse effects offederal grant, contract and
cooperative agreement funding of public agricultural researchon state agricultural total factor
productivity. Thedisplacement of public goods research byprivate or quasi-private goods
research can be a significant "crowing out" effect that can undermine the willingness of
taxpayers to support public goods research.
Stronger IPRS andPrivate Incentives
The relative importance ofprivate agriculturalR&D differs across western developed
countries. When the private sector undertakes a larger role in the production ofscientific
innovations, the demands on the public sector are reduced and the nature of the social need
changes. The private sector's share is relatively large (> 50 percent) in the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, United States, Germany, and France but small (< 30 percent) in Portugal, Greece,
Ireland, and Canada (Pardey, Roseboom, andCr^g; Alston, Pardey,and Smith 1998). .
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Both governmental policies and market forces greatly affect the incentives for private sector
investment in agricultural R&D.
Public policies have several different types ofeffects. First, government farm commodity
and agricultural trade pohcies affect the market prices for final commodities and inputs, the price
elasticities of aggregate supply of agricultural output and demand for agricultural inputs. Hence,
they affect the expected profitability of farmers' adoptmg new technologies and the derived
demand for them. Second, environmental, resource, public health, and food safety policies
change the cost structure offirms and (or) influence consumer demand for fmal products. Third,
public investments in general and pretechnology research produce new innovations, and some of
them provide good commercial opportunities for private sector development and marketing.
Fourth, national (and international) laws provide the mechanisms for definition, enforcement,
and transfer of IPRs (Evenson 1984).
IPRs include patents, breeders' rights, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. The
patent, which provides protection for embodied inventions, is the key IPR for private sector
innovation in agriculture ofwestern developed countries. Aholder ofapatent on an invention in
aparticular country is given the right by the granting country to exclude others from the
unauthorized use, sale, or manufacture ofthe invention for afinite period, generally 20 years.
These rights, however, apply only within the boundaries of the granting country, and only
through international patent right exchange agreements do they have power in other countries.
The Patent applicant must disclose or remove from secrecy the essential features of the
invention so as to "enable" others to make or use the invention (HufEinan and Evenson 1993,
Ch. 5). Disclosure has two main purposes. In return for granting alimited monopoly position to
15
the inventor for 20 years, the nature ofthe invention is revealed which facilitates accumulation of
the stock ofknowledge and exchanges among innovators and scientists, and second, acountry
establishes strong incentives-for private sectonfinance^and conduct ofR&D. Patent laws
generally exempt abstract or non-embodied ideas and concepts from protection. Thus, for an
invention embodied ina product, process, orbiological materials, the holder ofa patent can use
orlicense its use. •This gives the owner the right to an income stre^ from.the commercialization
ofinventions or from licensing it to others. However, if a country has ineffective procedures for
protecting patent rights, the size ofthe potential income stream from inventions is greatly
reduced and might be zero. '. i
The strength ofIPRS isassociated .with both the IPR laws and;the quality ortechnology
ofenforcement. Patent right laws for the 18,western developed countries,of this study, have been
strengthened over the past two decades, and this has increased the economic incentives for
private R&D. The strength ofpatents across the 18 countries can becompared using a patent
rights index developed by Ginarte and Park (1997): The overall index is derived from five
separate indexes for; (1) extentof coverage, (2)membership in international patentagreements,
(3) provisions for loss ofprotection, (4) enforcement mechanisms, and (5) duration ofprotection.
Forexample, loss of protection means ^working' requirements, compulsoty licensing, and
revocation ofpatents. Duration is theshare of20years that a granting coimtry gives protection.
Each of the five^components was given a value between 0 and 1by the authors for eachcountry
and year, and a country's patent-rights index is thesummation over these values, ^ng values
between 0 and 5. '
16
The valuesof the patent rights index, 1960-1990, forwesterndeveloped countries ^e
summarized. Furst, themean patentrights index value for the 18western developed countries is
significantly higher than the average value for a setof 111 high, middle, and low income
countries, being22 percenthigher in 1960 and 36 percent higher in 1990. Second, the patent
rights index for thewestern developed countries has increased rapidly since 1975. The mean of
the index increased slowly during 1960-1975 (anaverage rateof 0.7percent per year) andmore
rapidly during 1975-1990 (an annual average of 1.1 percent per year). Third, the U.S., Austria,
theNetherlands, and Italy standoutbecause of their highpatent-rights indexvalues (over 1975-
1990), andPortugal, Greece, andIreland staridout because of theirusually lowvalues. Fourth,
although most of the westerndeveloped countries have strengthened their patents rights over
1960-1990, the indexvalues for Canadaand Portugal are unchanged and the indexvalue for
Greece actually declined from 1985 to 1990.
Two technological advances haveeffectively strengthened IPR lawsassociated with
biological material. First, DNA analysis permits a scientist to identify with great precision the
genetic composition ofnew organisms. Inessence, DNA finger printing hasmade proving that
protected material has been pirated much easier. The patent examiners have, however, created
some new problems bygiving overlapping patents onbiological materials (Lesser, Horstkotte-
Wassler, Lile, and Byerlee 1999).
Second, scientific discovery by the USDA-ARS and Delta and Pine Land Company of
the terminator gene, or"Varietal Crop Protection System" may greatly change the economics
ofplant-breeding for non-hybrid crops. The terminator gene renders seeds sterile. This
significantly alters one ofthe two primary functions ofaplant's DNA, i.e., elimmates the ability
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ofthe plant to reproduce itself. Itmeans that farmer's cannot save their own seed and effectively
plant them. This gene has no. direct, beneficial effects on crop yields, which is different from
hybrid technology, where plants also cannot effectively reproduce themselves. The teminator
gene is now owned by Monsanto and has. the potential to be used to mcre^e the private returns
to innovators for a discovery but to reduce the social benefits ofthe discoverbecause many of
the positive externalities are eluninated. Hence, further strengthening ofintellectual property
right to encourage greater private R&D is notwithout controversy. .
. . Setting Efficient Incentives for Research
Because of significant changes inthe R&D environment over thepast two decades,
scientists and research administrators find themselves struggling with new issues and employing
new territory. Important features of theR&D production process add upto a difficult
environment in which to set efficient incentives for.scientists' effort and quality ofoutput.
KeyAttributes ofResearch > j .
First, the R&D payoff is best described as the "best" of scientists' outputs„rather,than
their total output. Second; the research production process is subject to a large amount of exante
uncertainty. No target discovery mayoccur, a poordiscovery mayoccur, or a greatdiscovery
might occur. Furthermore, unanticipated discoveries frequently occur. Hence, payoff orvalue of
a research project is luiknown at theoutset of theproject and output/quality is noncontractable.
Third, asymmetric information exists on scientists' efforts (^d ability). . The^ scientist hasmuch
betterinformation abouthowhe allocates his effort andon his, research abihty than the research
administrators. Hence, it is generallyeconomically impossible for a researchadministrator
to monitor the effort of scientists. Furthermore, given ex ante uncertainty in the research
18
production function, it is impossible for aresearch administrator to accurately infer effort
(or ability) from observed output/quality.' Hence, amoral hazard arises in contracting on
scientists' effort becausethe administrator cannotverify that a scientists' effort has met any
agreed upon contract terms. Fourth, administrators are less risk adverse than administrators
because they manage a much larger portfolio ofprojects. Each scientist has atmost one ortwo
projects per period, but a research administrator may have 30 to several hundred scientists
working. With different attitudes toward risk between administrators and scientists, potential
inefficiencies arisewhenscientists are expected to beara larger share of research risk.
ModelingResearch Incentives with Uncertain Payoffs
Before assessing implications ofrecent trends inagricultural research, we sketch the basic
model (Huffman and Just 1998). First, the research administrator isassumed to observe the
research payoffatthe end ofa project, to compensate scientists' for their effort, possibly with a
compensation package including a fixed salary and aperformance incentive, and to be risk
neutral about R&D payoffs.^ For the purpose ofthis paper, a research project is anattempt to
develop aparticular innovation or an annual contract to conduct research in aparticular area.
The administrator's objective is tomaximize expected R&D payoffnet ofscientists'
compensation.
Second, scientists are assumed to obtam utility from income, disutility from effort or
work, to be risk averse, and to have areservation utility. More specifically, each scientist
(denoted by the subscript i) is assumed to have aquadratic cost of effort, Ci(ei) =kiej^/2 (which
generates apositive-sloped effort schedule with respect to compensation) where Cj is effort, to
have constant absolute risk aversion (j);, to have afixed certainty-equivalent reservation utility
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(^i), arid to choose effort on research to m^imize individual expected utility subject to attmning .
at least the reservation utility. - ' -
Third, each scientist"is assumed towork alone (to' avoid team or easy-rider problems) and
toundertake one project thatproduces exactly one indivisible unit ofoutput, butwith random
quality depending on his effort. Hence, the research output is one-dimensional. Eor notational
simplicity, the non-stochastic component ofthe production-process isassumed identical across
scientists — anassumption that is easily relaxed later—so the quality indexcan be simply
defined as effortplus'random components. To examine the implications of random quality, we .
let • • "
(1) yi = ei+ €i + 6 -
where yj is quality of research produced by^scientist i, ej is a scientist^specific random component
with zero mean and variance and 6 is a random component affecting.all scientists with^zero
mean and variance The scientist-specific random term may represent.the effects of
individual ability, creativityand efficiency ofmental processes. The commonshockmight
represent unanticipated problems associated with the particular innovation toward which all the
scientists' efforts are directed, or it could represent unanticipated exogenous advances in the
publicstock of knowledgeduring the research project. Assuming that ej and.5 are uncorrelated,
the variance ofresearch output is the summation ofthe two^variances, 0)^:= a\ + 0p(n0tethat
if the two are correlated, a suitable redefinition can make them uncorrelated),
The effort level, Cj, is the source ofasymmetric information. It is unobservable to the
research administrator- but-treated as known to the scientist. Research'quality, y^, is assumed to
be observable to both the administrator and scientist but only at the end ofthe research project.
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We permit more than one scientist towork independently onidentical research projects, but only
the highest quality output contributes tothe administrator's R&D payoff. This might arise
through the publication process where an editor publishes the "best" paper on a topic given that it
adds significantly to the state ofknowledge, orfarmers use only thecrop variety or animal breed
that has the "best" anticipated performance.
OptimalCompensationofResearch Scientists
We derive theoptimal compensation scheme, given the attributes of research, the
scientist, and administrator. To convey somebasicresults aboutoptimal compensation and the
associated R&D payoff, consider conU-acting between a research administrator (or funding
agency) and one scientist. According to principal-agent theory, when contracting is repeated
many times andtheagent has discretion in actions including the level and timing of effort, the
structure ofthe optimal pay scheme is linear in the observed principal's payoff (Holmstrom and
Milgrom; Levitt). Hence, we consider Pay Scheme I consisting oftwo parts: (i) a guaranteed
payment, ttj, that is independent ofthe observedR&D payoff, and (ii) an incentive payment that
amounts to a positive share, pj, of the observed R&D payoff,
(2) Wi = ai + piyi.
Alarger pj implies a "higher powered" incentive scheme. Substituting equation (1) into (2), the
structure of thispay scheme is seen to be linear in thescientist's effort,
(3) Wi(ei) = a; + PiCj + pjCi + Pi6.
Equation (3) depicts how ex ante uncertainty in the research production process, is transmitted
into ex ante wage uncertainty for the scientist. From equation (3), the expected wage conditional
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on effort is E(Wi) =ttj +Pi Ci and the wage variance is v(Wi) = P- cof. Where the scientist's utility
is Ui(ei) =Ui'[Wi(ei) - Ci(ei)], the scientist's expected utility maxunization problem is
MaxE[Ui(ei)] = aj+ Pie; - iSkiCj^ - .5(t)iPi^ (Oi^
=1
for which first-order conditions imply the optimal effort choice, ei = Pi/kj.
With one scientist, the optimal compensation scheme for the administrator is obtained by
choosing a-, and p; to maximize the administrator's expected R&D payoffnet ofscientist's
compensation subject to (i) the scientist allocating effort to maximize his expected utility and (ii)
the resulting certainty-equivalent utility being atleast as large as the scientist's certainty-
equivalent reservation utility Hj,
(4) Max E[ei' - Wi(ei')] = e;' -a;- piC;' s.t E[Ui(ei)] ^ jXi.
••• .
Note that conditioning the administrator's problem msures that the scientist will beoffered a
compensation package that he will accept. In our model, it is unproductive for the administrator
to offer a compensation scheme that the scientist will reject because the administrator's expected
payoff iszero when the scientist rejects his compensation package, i.e., e= 0. Kuhn-Tucker
conditions (ordirect examination) reveal a boundary solution, E[Ui(ei)] = (ij, implying
(5) tti' = ^li - .5(pi-)2/ki
Substituting (5) into (4) arid maximizing with respect to pj, or substituting (5) into the
corresponding first-order condition for Pi, reveals the optimal scientist performance incentive,
(6) p;= ^.... ,





With this optimal pay scheme, some notable results follow: First, the administrator
compensates the scientist for effort and provides partial insurance against income risk from ex
ante income uncertainty. With asymmetric information, the administrator does not provide full
insurance because itwould create amoral hazard problem for the administrator—the scientist
would be fully insured against income risk and, thus, tend to shirk on effort.
Second, the guaranteed component ofpay is positively related to the scientist's
reservation utility Hj, but the reservation utility has no impact on the incentive component ofpay.
Third, as the riskiness ofthe research process increases, i.e., increases, the importance
ofthe incentive component ofpay relative to the guaranteed component decreases. The optimal
pay guarantee is increasing (decreasing) in riskiness of the research process if4>ikia)i^ <(>) 3.
Thus, high risk, high risk aversion and/or high opporUmity cost oftime is sufficient to cause
the guaranteed payment to mcrease in research risk. Ifresearch is infinitely risky (cOj^ - =«),
then P* =0, and the optimal pay scheme is'a guaranteed or fixed wage equal to the certainty-
equivalent reservation utility (and Wj = ttj* = Hi).
Fourth, when scientists differ in their reservation utility, degree ofrisk aversion,
opportunity cost of effort, or riskiness of research output, the optimalpay scheme differs across
scientist. The incentive-performance factor is higher for ascientist with less risk aversion, lower
opportunity cost of effort, and lower scientist-specific research risk. The guaranteed component
of the wage is higher for scientists who have alarger reservation utility (e.g., higher salary
offers elsewhere). The guaranteed component is also higher (lower) for ascientist with
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higher risk aversion if<t)ikiG)i^ <(>) 3, and for ascientist with higher opportunity cost ofeffort
if(l)ikiCOi2<(>)1.78.-- • ^
To Examine tiiese imphcations further, note that theexpected R&D payoff for the
research administrator after paying wages is . . ^ ,
(7) = (1 - p;)e; -
2k.il ^
andthe expectedwage of,the scientist is .
(8) E(W;) = + P'e;' =•
2k.(l +4).k.a),)
.1 •>
These expressions reveal, not surprisingly, that a research administrator isbetter offcontracting
witha scientist that has low researchrisk, low risk aversion, and lowopportunity cost of effort.
Also, the scientist whohas thesecharacteristics fares betterin terms of expected compensation.
Perhaps, the result that scientists with low opportunity cost and lowriskearn greater
compensation is surprising, butit is explained bythe fact that more is traded away for purposes
of riskavoidance by those withhighopportunity cost and high riskaversion. Among thepool of
talent represented by scientists, at least two of these three attributes (research risk, risk aversion,
and opportunity cost) are likely negatively correlated, which adds to the research administrator's
' * - - I ' ' i '
dilemma of choosing scientists. The implications for research institutions where changes in
employment are infrequent (research institutions with permanent employees and universities with
tenure systems) is that hiring decisions are crucial andpotentially themost crucial element of
successful and efficient R&D administration.
A , ,1
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In this model, an increase inex ante R&D payoff uncertainty, say due to an increase in
the variance ofthe common shock o^, causes the scientist to allocate less effort to the research
project which reduces the expected quality of research and the expected R&D payoff. Because
ofasymmetric information regarding effort and incomplete insurance against the scientist's
income risk, the scientist's expected compensation is also reduced. Furthermore, the expected
R&D payoffnet of scientists compensation is reduced. Thus, in this model where an optimal
compensation policy is in place and the research administrator employs only one scientist per
research project (i.e., there are no duplicate projects), it is never optimal for the administrator to
take actions that will increase ex ante uncertainty for scientists unless they lead tocounter veiling
effects on research quality.
SomeImplicationsfor Funding Mechanisms
The attributes ofdifferent fimding mechanisms, e.g., block grants, "outside" peer review
competitive grants, are different in ways that affect effort and research quality. One research
policy change where the scientist could perceive increased risk is where formula funding is
replaced by competitive grant funding. For example, this change might increase the risk that a
scientist will receive adequate funding to carry out or complete planned research. An increase in
perceived risk would lead ascientist to allocate less effort to research, which in turn lowers
expected quality and expected net R&D payoff from research. Thus, any switch from formula
funding to competitive grant funding should be verified to have asufficiently positive effect on
project quality, for example by weedmg out frivolous projects or chaimeling funds to higher
quality scientists (accounting for imperfect correlation between quality ofproject proposals and
ultimate research discovery quality), to offset the effect of increased risk perceived by scientists.
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Furthermore, based on the summary ofevidence presented by Knetsch (1999),' the additional
compensation required by scientists to bear this added risk maybe much larger than research
administrators' anticipate. . * < , . i
Although peer-reviewed competitive grant'programs have been growing in popularity
in Western developed countries, they also have important imperfections and deficiencies as
a research contract. The problems are associated with ex ante uncertainty of the research
production process and asymmetric information on scientists' effort and ability. For example, a
research proposal has little direct value in the R&D payoffofaproject, but apeer-reviewed grant
system places the quality incentive on the research proposal rather than the actual discovery. The
research output is observed only after the award is given and its quality is imperfectly correlated
with the proposal quality. . - '
' Additional problems arise from the heavy externalities that extramural competitive grants
programs impose on scientists and their institutions. The externalities are because of a system in
which the external funding aigencies do notexplicitly finance all ofscientists' time. If scientists
receive no compensation forproposal writing orare compensated only forsuccessful proposals,
the incentive is to write proposals for work thathas already been completed or to write proposals
that appear attractive butcommit little. The resources required for unsuccessful proposals must
becovered by the scientists' institutions possibly at highopportunity costs in terms of teaching
time or reduced research outputfrom otherresearch projects.' Theproposal evaluation and
ranking process also consume scientists' timethat is not compensated by granting agencies.
Finally,becauseoftheir small numbers, the stand^ds of reviewers and reviewpanelsare
more narrow, conservative, and/or possiblyshort-sighted than the broad scientificcommunity on
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acceptable research methods and potentially attainable discoveries. Thus, the "peer panels" tend
to impose homogeneity ofapproaches (which reduces the diversity ofsampling) or to require
preliminary research evidence (which retards the research process). Asocially desirable national
research funding mechanism for basic and pretechnology science should not .unload the riskiness
ofscientific discovery onto institutions or individuals that have high risk premiums. Many of
these issuesare addressed in a recentGeneral Accounting Office report (U.S. GAO). These are
problems that could potentially be mitigated in the federal peer-reviewed competitive grant
programs.
With the switch from block and institution grants for agricultural research toward
competitive grants, given the current structure ofcompetitive grants, scientists are being
expected to bear amuch larger share ofthe production risk. Because scientists are more risk
adverse than research administrators, this represents socially inefficient riskbearing. Scientists
can reasonably be expected to be compensated well for bearing this added risk, otherwise their
research effort and quality ofresearch will be reduced significantly. Itseems unlikely that this is
the outcome that was anticipated when the recent trend toward competitive grant funding of
agricultural research was initiated.
Concluding Observations
The twentieth century has been one ofamazing science-based technological progress.
Both public and private financing have been important for paying for scientists' efforts. The
organization of research, including its incentives seem important to the direction ofefforts of
scientists, the quality ofdiscoveries, and "the composition and impacts ofdiscoveries on
agricultural productivity and on social welfare. Based on earlier considerations presented in the
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paper, some implications for the organization ofagricultural research in the 21st century-are
presented.
The national agricultural R&D systems of"l^ge countries" that have deyeloped as a
system of shared public and private.finance and performance of agricultural research-and the
public component is decentralized between the^ nation and state/provincial governments, e.g., the
United States and Germany, are.bestpositioried formeeting Ae R&D:needs oftheir residents in
the 21st century- These systems are better positioned for financing and conducting agricultural
research tomeetthe changing demand for local or-impure public goods than: the.national
financed, administered, and conducted systems, e.g., France. The decentralized systems are l^ge
enough to obtain many ofthe benefits firom basic or pretechnology research. Small countries
must strive to improve their access tonew technological innovations by foiining new political
alliances withother coxmtries; being open to-international technology tra^fere, ^d to imports of
technically enhanced goods directly. . ' , , / ,
New political jurisdictions will :be formed for the purpose of fmancing- agricultural
research producing impure public goods benefitting primely the jurisdiction. This will become .
an important newfimding source forpublic research institutions. Tliese jurisdictions ^^^ll include,
newalliances across countries andJsubregions withinlarge countries. Small countries will look
actively.for potential alliances with.other, especially larger countries, that they canjoin. They.
are too small.to capture.significant benefits from pretechnology ^d-general science research
,supporting agriculture. Fi^ermore, they will increasingly see that it is.to their long term
advantage to openmarkets so that theycanbenefit from the teclmically a.dvances made in other
countries. Within large countries,a mosaicof overlapping politicalj^sdictions may develop;
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theyhaveworked well for the provision ofmanyother localpublicgoods and services, e.g.,
education, water control districts.
Intellectual property rights will be further strengthened to increase the share of total
agricultural research, e.g., in biotechnology and newinformation systems, that is financed and
conducted in the private sector. Drawing upon the informationrevealed in the recently published
patent rights index forwestern developed"countries, thepotential exists for further strengthening
thepatent rights. This willmake it possible for the private sector to provide more of its own
researchneeds, and we believe that this is the best direction for the private sector to channel
resources for research.
Private sector financing ofpublic agricultural researchwill not grow in importance as a
funding sourcefor public institutions in western developed countries. During the 21st century,
it will become clear that joint public-privatesector financing of joint-ventures research venture
may look like goodopportunities, but they actually comeat high social cost due to crowding out
othersocially preferred projects. The private interests of companies and commodity groups are
seldomwell aligned with the social'good or public interest and few companies and clubs are
willing tomake unrestricted research grants to public research institutions or scientists as Revlon
has supported cancer research over thepast decade atUCLA Medical School. This creates a
major conflict with the interests oftaxpayers that provide amajority ofthesupport ofmost
public agricultural research institutions. Furthermore, because we see no evidence that public
agricultural research funds are allocated so as to equalize expected marginal returns, joint
public-private ventures come ata high opportunity cost when they redirect public fimds to
areas that have a lower social rates of return, or crowd out other socially worthwhile projects.
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As the stock ofknowledge continue to.grow and mtellectual property rights toscientific , ,
discoveries are strengthened, the division.of labor between research undertaken by the public ^d, .
private sector will continue to shift. The private sector will find it profitable to undertake ,
an increasing'share ofthe applied research. The public sector should and will.^locate an
increasing share ofits-research efforts to'discoveries inbasic and pretechnology sciences. -, • •
Some areas ofapplied research, however, reniain privately unprofitable.but socially worthwhile,
e.g., research onenvironmental and-natural resource quality, food safety and human nutrition,
agricultural policy, and genetic improvement ofminor crops. Thus; there continues to be a need
for selective applied research by the publicsector in socially worthwhile areas;, .
Major changes areexpected during the 21st centu^ inthemanagement of agricultural
research, thephilosophy of funding, institutions, and mechanisms for distributing funds. .
Scientists employed -by research institutions?will increasingly receive incentive compensation- ,^
based on thequality of theirresearch or value^of theresearch payoff. A^dministratbrs will, . ,
increasingly implement a partial incentive contract withscientists that involves bothan optimal
compensation guaranteeand an optimalperformance incentive. The performance-incentive -
shouldbe defined by the characteristics that matter-in valuing^the R&D payoff,,to the employing
institution. More basically, whatmatters in valuing.the R&Dpayoffwill most likelybe rootedin
the valuesof the politicaljurisdiction or clientele financing the institution:(or,rese^ch).
^Quality-based incentivecontracting will become a relativepopular^ mechanism for
allocation funds from newly established political jurisdictions that finance research to research
performing institutions-and scientists. Principalragent theoryand incentivecontacting for,
research implies that optimal contracts have a quality-based (and not a cost-based) incentive.
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Contracts for researchwherequality of output is of upmost importance should not include cost
incentives. Given that scientists' effort is not contractible arid output is uncertain, an incentive to
cutcost unduly cuts scientists' effort and quality of theoutput andthevalue of theresearch
payoff Furthermore, contracts will beincreasingly defined interms ofbroad performance
attributes that reflect the value of the research payoffs to the funding institutions or financing
jurisdiction rather than specifications ofa particular mnovation. This added breadth can be
expected to reduce riskiness ofprojects to scientists and induce increased research effort.
Traditionally structured peer-review competitive granting systems will lose their glamor
during the 21st century asthe imperfections and inefficiencies iri.this type ofresearch contract
become more widely known. Although peer-reviewed competitive grant programs are popular
with the U.S. National Science Foundation and National Institutes ofHealth and research
financing institutions elsewhere, they have important'imperfections anddeficiencies as a research
contract. The problems are associated with exante uncertainty of theresearch production
process and asymmetric information on scientists' effort and ability. The research output is
observed only after theaward is given and its quality is imperfectly correlated withtheproposal
quality. Additional problems arise from the heavy extemalifies that national competitive grants
programs impose on scientists and their institutions when they do not pay the fiill cost of
research. The externalities arise because the national funding agencies do not explicitly finance,
all of scientists' time and effort for research. The resourcesrequired for unsuccessful proposals
must becovered by the scientists' institutions possibly at high opportumty costs in terms of
teaching time, reduced research output from other research fimds orunpaid time. The proposal
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evaluation and ranking process also consume scientists' time that is not compensated by external
granting agencies. ' ' •
The purpose ofresearch proposals will be re-evaluated, and the proposal process will be
modified. Short research proposals (e.g., a few pages inlength) covering reasonably long ,
periods oftime (e.g., 3-5 years) serve sufficiently to permit administrators to monitor, review,
and manage—ifthe more crucial steps are t^eh to implement optimal incentives based,on
attributes ofvalue to the institution. Research proposals should state the objectives sufficiently
to allow theadministrator to verify thatanticipated payoffs fit the criteria thatareused in valuing
the R&D payoffof the institution.•Under the new management ofagricultural research,
• s •
scientists' effort and time for reviewing and evaluating will beallocated exclusively to assessing
the quality ofresearch output, e.g.,. reviewing manuscripts for publication and evaluating
research payoffs,and not to researchproposals.
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Table 1. Expenditures on Public Agricultural Research and Rate ofGrowth (constant
1993 ppp): Western Developed Countries, 1971,1981, 1993
Level
' ($ mil)
Rate of growth (%)
Coimtries/Region 1971 1981 1993 1971-81 1981-93
Western Europe
1.49Austria 19.7 - 23.0 27.5 1.55 '
Belgium 31.4 47.2 36.2 4.08 -2.21
Denmark 35.2 38.3 59.6 0.84 3.69
FiiUand 23.2 • 39.1 •• 64.2 5:22 • 4.13
France 298.0 410.0 ' • 503.5 •' '3:19 1.71
Germany' 308.6 299.8 332.8 ' - -0.29 0.87
Greece "23.7 49.0 •' 31.5 7.26 -3.68
Ireland 29.7 33.9 27.9 1.32 -1.62
Italy 68.3 .188,2^ . 360.6 10.14 5.42
Netherlands 134.7 262.1''' ' • 226.7 4.06 0.96
Norway 32.8 58.0 ' \05.3' " 5.70 4.97
Portugal 28.3 29.4 59.4 0.38 5.86
Spain 51.0 98.6 214.2 6.59 6.47
Sweden 57.7 81.1 138.3 3.40 4.45
Swiss 34.4 36.6 50.2 0.62 2.63
United Kingdom 274.5 371.0 370.8 3.01 -0.00
Subtotal 1,451.2 2,005.3 2,608.7 3.23 2.19
North America
Canada 354.7 452.3 466.4 2.43 0.26
United States 1,235.6 1,620.4 2,054.3 2.71 1.98
Subtotal 1,590.3 2,072.7 2,520.7 2.65 1.63
Total 18 countries 3,041.5 4,078.0 5,129.4 2.93 1.91
'Only for (West) Germany
Source: Huffman and Just 1999b.
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Endnotes
1. The new terminator gene recently developed jointly by USDA-ARS and Delta and Pine
Land Company,, and now owned by Monsanto, could change the economics ofbin-run
seed became it disrupts the ability ofa seed to reproduce itself. This could increase the
expected private return to wheat varietal developrhent, which has been an area that the
private sectorhad largely dropped.
2. This isanexample ofthe Sometimes suggested linear and uni-directional relationship
from advances in science to advances in technology. Although this may be a good
representation for some ofthe advances inbiotechnology, itdoes not hold generally.
I return to this issue liater in the paper. . ;
3. .The risk neutral preference for administrators can bejustified bythinking ofthem as
.managing a large portfolio ofprojects. The assimption ofrisk neutrality can be modified
but atsignificant cost inadditional, complexity ofthe presentation but not change the
basic conceptual conclusions, provided the scientists are-more risk averse than the
' administrators.
4. We chose for our agent's (scientist's) utility function, the one that has attracted the most
attention in the principal-agent literature.
